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THE MASTERY OF THE EVENT

(OR STEPS FOR THE RE-SHAVING OF SHAGPAT)

Following is the republication of the substance of an address, with added notes, by Dr. Tudor Jones, then Chairman and now Advisory Chairman of the Social Credit Secretariat, delivered in London on September 12, 1953. Mr. H. R. Purchase presided:—

Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen. You, Mr. Chairman, have just mentioned that this is the first time we have met in London as a body of Social Crediters supporting the Secretariat, and their friends, since Major Douglas died. An earlier attempt to arrange a meeting fell through, for reasons into the nature of which I need not enter, and the blow we have suffered has now had nearly a year to show its effects. I think we can congratulate ourselves that they are not worse than they actually are. I think that they are not is in great part attributable to the care and foresight of Douglas himself in defining the principles which must underlie not only an association such as ours but any association for a common objective, unless it is to be speedily deflected from its policy. I think that they are not greater is also due to the degree of understanding shared by most of us. There are some exceptions; but they are few, and in every case which has come to my notice their misunderstandings long ante-date Douglas's death. I do not hope to contend successfully with a psychological situation with which he and I jointly could not contend successfully, try as we might. When he had done his best, he let sleeping dogs lie, or barking dogs bark themselves out, whichever you like; and I think there is one point there which I would emphasise, namely the assertion that our misgivings, such as they are, are occasioned by the actions of persons whose attitude towards the Secretariat which Douglas founded gave us concern and caused us trouble long before last September. I do not believe there is a trouble centre of which I am not informed, and I say that in every case the troublemaker was a trouble-maker for many years before the dawn of 1952. They were not known to be to those who worked side by side with them in some cases, and if they are now coming into the open it is with a sideways suggestion that "only now . . . etc., etc." If the total is not above half-a-dozen, half-adozen resolute people may do much harm: we must wait and see how much.

As Mr. Purchase has told you, my intention is to elaborate some paragraphs written in *The Social Crediter* concerning our plans for the future.

But before I embark on that topic, there are one or two questions which I have already received, the answers to which bear upon what I have to say later, and it may economise in time if I anticipate some of the later passages of my address.

"Why is it difficult to get women interested in Social Credit?"

It has often been remarked that whereas women are often in a majority at meetings of any kind, or of some kinds, men are always in the majority at Social Credit meetings. I don't think the question is by any means frivolous. The question was raised in the cabin of Douglas's yacht at St. Mawes the day before the Ashridge Address, and Mrs. Douglas made the remark that what deeply concerned her was the attitude of the woman who put a drag of restraint upon her mate when he touched some interest which she feared because she sensed that it was compromising to his material success—and to hers, of course.

Now, if I may say so, I think that places the emphasis in the right place. Indeed, I might leave it at that, if it were not for the fact: that it may pass unnoticed that the mere complicity in a standard of social behaviour which is, after all, pretty common, and seemingly becoming commoner, does not by any means exhaust the implications of the remark. There are a few women who know that Social Credit is right intuitively. I suggest that if they are not making Social Crediters of their husbands it is because their husbands are not made of suitable material. I think that if instead they made Social Crediters of their male friends, the result might be socially undesirable. That may sound cryptic; but I mean that Social Credit is that sort of thing: it touches the deepest interests and concerns of men and women, and once you touch those interests and concerns—the consequences are more far-reaching than you anticipate.

I think you will see when I have come to the end of this argument that I am not disparaging men or women: I am trying to put both in the right relationship to Social Credit. But to do so they must be put in the right relationship to one another. I do not put forward this theory with any suggestion that it belongs to the sound doctrine of Social Credit, though I believe that if it is right it probably does. I am merely stating a case. You know as well as I do that, for the production of human offspring two processes are necessary: impregnation and gestation.

The result of the two processes in conjunction is a *corpus*, a body, a living body truly, but a body weighing usually about seven to nine pounds on the scale where the nurse places it as soon as she conveniently can. No male has ever given birth to a baby: the role of the male is impregnation not gestation. He

is not less important on that account, but all his efforts achieve is a material body. Now you know further that while this is so, the potentialities of the sexes are the same, a fact that is recognised in embryology by representing the sexes according to the formulae W+m for the male, and w+M for the female. In other words we say the Wolffian element is in the ascendancy in the male, but the Müllerian element in the female. It has long been a favourite speculation of mine whether in the matters of the spirit the like process does not operate; but that here the role of the sexes is actually reversed, and it is the male who performs the gestative function, while the masculine, impregnative role is performed by the female—and woe be to her if it is not performed with due secrecy and unconsciousness. ("And thy Father which seeth in secret himself shall reward thee openly.") This is not Benjamin Kidd's notion of Woman as the bearer of the "emotion of the ideal", nor is it the "Service of the Soul" symbolised by the "Service of Women". The notion could very profitably be expanded.

If, as Douglas once said, politics really should not be the main preoccupation of most men, it certainly should not be the preoccupation of most women. We should be able to take the authenticity of the state of society in which we live for granted, and start from there. The world is demonstrating more and more clearly why we cannot start from there. Its very foundations are false. I am greatly impressed by the evident experience of the Church that the monastic function, whatever it is, cannot stand the strain of full physiological life. I have met priests who are in istent that the priestly life is in no sense above the common life of the community. "He that is greatest, let him be as the younger". Briefly, I do not think that if it were the case that women are not interested in Social Credit to the extent of busying themselves with our affairs it would reflect in any sense upon them or upon us. The perversions which man has suffered at the hands of Finance are evenly distributed. It looks as though, in the situation with which we are trying to deal, both men and women have abdicated in regard to the discharge of their higher functions.

Quite of a different kind is the question:—"I have found in my dealings with others that sometimes if one puts forward a criticism of some proposed policy or line of action—stating that it is incompatible with Social Credit (to which one has given one's adherence) the reply is something to the effect that 'while so and so is the case regarding the present financial and economic system, Social Credit is not a 'panacea', and at any rate it is only dealing with part of to-day's problem. Things have changed in the industrial set-up in the last decade, and a restatement of Douglas's thesis is required'."

To begin at the question-begging end, no fundamental change whatsover has taken place during the past half-century at least, except an acceleration in increase of scale. It is still the pretence of Finance that the total financial cost of production can be recovered in prices (taxes are prices). It can't. When it can, the fundamental principle of Social Credit will have been ceded, and debt will be on the way to extinction. The deficiency is made up by practically costless bank-credit, and the purpose of concealment of the fact is to hide the quite arbitary nature of the procedure which determines policy. War is incidental.

The which-step-do-we-take-first dilemma is one which is said to afflict centipedes, among whom it might have some

justification. I cannot see how it can really trouble any realistically-minded man. It doesn't matter how many or how few steps there are between a man in a hole and his objective at whatever distance from the hole, nature decides that he can never in any circumstances take the second step before the first. We are in a hole, and once that is conceded, if also it is conceded that getting out of it is only one step towards an undefined and perhaps not so blissful future, the first step is the step out of the hole. The hole we are in is determination of the objectives for which we toil in society by a hidden minority who have power to enforce their will. That power is exercised through the misuse of money, in the broadest sense. We must put a stop to that. That is the first step, and all we assert, so far from our advertising a panacea is that many things will be different when we have taken it, and generally other problems will be easier to solve. At this stage, at all events, we are not urging this or that solution of those other problems, and we admit their existence with perfect candour. But, we say, neither you nor we can begin to solve them until you have the power to do so, and you haven't. You must get it: that is the first step. Now it is true that there are many illusory ways of taking the first step-many useless as it were muscular jerkswhich do not add up to the step contemplated. But that is really quite another matter, and if you desire to move your political limbs properly, there is really nothing to prevent you from learning.

Now it is the question of that desire to move our political limbs properly that is my deep anxiety at the present moment, and here, therefore, the substance of my address properly begins.

Side by side with a considerable admiration, the intensity of which I think some of you would scarcely believe, for The Social Crediter, there has been throughout the years a steady disparagement of its peculiarities, which has its origin in a theory of our mission which leans, sometimes lightly, sometimes heavily to belief, dear to the heart of intellectuals, rationalists par excellence, that the complex society in which we live is directed and maintained in its course by intellectual conviction, and therefore you must always be looking around for something which someone can understand and must be for ever busy communicating that something to that someone. Insensibly, the minds of such people are turned to numbers. It ceases to be the quality of the idea, the importance and significance of the idea communicated which matters most: what matters most is how often you can communicate an acceptable idea to a different person. Without going over very familiar ground, that is nonsense. The world doesn't work like that. How it works is entirely a different matter. It does not work like that. By pursuing that path, all you do is to drop steadily to lower and lower levels of consciousness to touch broader and broader fields of ineffectual conviction. The end, if there is an end, is to swing whole populations into assent, recorded by the simplest and most mechanical agencies—a plain cross, which must have diagonal lines to it, not a vertical and a horizontal line even, on a piece of paper, dropped secretly into a slot, but assent to something quite unrelated to any intelligibe policy.

I have heard the case argued with Major Douglas himself: says the questioner: "Well, couldn't you alter it just a little, so that ...?"—"So that what?" Douglas has asked; but at that point the questioner breaks down, for he well knows that what he *must* say, but dare not because it exposes his bias, is,

"So that what is said more closely matches what the reader expects to be said, because his mind already contains it". "We descend to meet".

I am not concerned any longer to contest this argument, because, as already announced in *The Social Crediter*, we have decided upon a new course. What I do want to make clear is my opinion that one of the chief reasons for the failure of *The Social Crediter* to effect the object of maintaining it in existence is the draining away of its potential by the disparagement it has suffered in this way. Unless we do something that will go on, and must, if that should be, completely negative any gain we make. At a time when, whatever the grave apprehensions which disturb us and everybody else, there are signs of a clarification of what we may call the effective public mind, that would be a pity.

What The Fig Tree will do on its appearance is first of all to short-circuit the argument about what it ought to be doing. It will be quite obviously clear what it is doing. There will be no doubt about it. It will look what it is. It will have the face and expression of its character. If, in the reader's opinion it ought to be doing something else, there will at least be not the slightest doubt that it isn't. I think that degree of definiteness will be a great assistance. The overriding peculiarity of the kind of journal I have in mind is that very few people who read them expect to find all the articles really attractive. They read some and look at others. They choose. What guides their choice is individual predisposition, taste, interest. Who are they to be?

I do not want to frighten anybody off by too boldly nominating him as a future subscriber to *The Fig Tree*. The nucleus of its circulation will, we hope, indeed we expect, be the present subscribers to *The Social Crediter*. But we are looking farther afield than that. When Douglas said he was no longer looking for people to convert but for someone with a problem to solve, he defined exactly what we are doing now, though many of us were not doing it then. Who are they? Where do we find them? I give you four selected groups of people in the community where I personally have found a growing uneasiness, and a sense of restlessness and a consciousness of something missing, something to be straightened out, something to be contested.

They are (1) a growing body of critical, thwarted, young research workers in the physical and medical sciences, (2) a distinct group of men usually older but many younger men as well who have come up against the problem of the Constitution. They are lawyers. Then (3) there is the agitated, moving, shifting, field, characterised by immense energy we should say ill-directed, in some cases evil and mischievous, of the Labour movement. To do anything with any one of these opportunities means that we must, I believe, understand what is happening and why it is happening much more deeply than we do at present. Lastly there is the very able following of the psychiatrist Jung, embedded it may be in the doctrine of higher reality as a "projection" of the mind, but already acquainted and concerned with some features which are basic to our problem.

Someone writes to me, "I think quite clearly most of us Social Crediters are looked upon by others as peculiar (in the

worst sense) and it may be our manner towards others that puts them off". I have noticed it. If you met a man out tiger shooting whose notion of the procedure was 10 stand and address the tiger in words such as there, for example: "Now you know, tiger, I am in a position of great advantage. In the first place I am mounted, let me tell you, on the most splendid elephant that has ever trod this or any other jungle. In the second place, I am armed with very fine rifle, the mechanism of which it would require a much greater man than I thoroughly to understand, but a rifle of potentialities of what I believe is called 'muzzle-velocity' and accuracy of sighting quite exceptional. My elephant was carrying it in his trunk when I met him. Don't you see, tiger, that discretion would certainly be the better part of useless valour?" Tigers, though I have never met a tiger, are perfectly well aware that it is the aim and skill and intrepidity of the marksman that matters far more than his dubious speeche. And so it is with the bit of hunting with which we are concerned. I suggest that if we do not assume powers which we do not possess, but steadfastly use those powers which we do possess-and that by the Grace of God, and not by any power of our own, except that we have placed ourselves at his disposal—by some Rule of universal application, these suffice for what tasks can be justly expected of us to perform. If we do not borrow or steal credit, but confine ourselves to the employment of what credit is naturally given to us, or divinely given to us in the practical affairs of life, it suilices. I think to behave otherwise is 'peculiar', and, as my correspondent says, '(in the worst sense)'.

Their own ardour offers the strongest temptation to most Social Crediters to tread those paths (or that path; for, really, it is only one path) which even angels fear. Figuratively, it is the temptation to extend one's reach to such a point that the balance is disturbed.

What I have to say in the rest of this address may be represented as leading into temptation of this kind. I am in a dilemma. Either I can say, as carefully as I may what is in my mind, or I can fall down on what seems to me to be a necessary and a vital communication.

My mind goes back to a day about three years ago, when Douglas stopped his car at the northern end of the famous avenue of trees leading out of Aberfeldy. He looked across to the river and then the town beyond it in silence, and then said, very slowly and with deep gravity:—

"You know, T.J., I think the time is approaching when we shall have to *challenge* this monstrous and fantastic overgrowth of industrial expansion—fundamentally. Really, you know, I personally can see nothing particularly sinful about a *small* dynamo; but this thing we've got is past a joke. If it isn't a joke, it is Satanic".

Well, now ladies and gentlemen, I'm quite agreeable. I don't know whether you are; but to those of us who are, How are we going to do it? I submit that the time envisaged by Douglas has come; and I say again: How are we going to do it? How are we going to challenge, and successfully challenge, what he called 'this monstrous overgrowth of industrial expansion'?

During the past six months I have been giving particular attention to the question, which seems to me to be the first

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question to be asked—and answered!—What is it we are challenging? In this pursuit I have stumbled—or have been led—upon some very astonishing things: things I knew about before, things I have known all the time. But suddenly they have assumed a new perspective. And suddenly they have assumed more than the appearance of a direct relation to Social Credit and to the predicament of our Social Credit movement.

"Deem me not self-willed, nor with pride high-strung, That I am dumb; my heart is gnawed to see Myself thus mocked and jeered. These gods, to whom Owe they their green advancement but to me? But this ye know; and, not to teach the taught, I'll speak of it no more. Of human kind, My great offence in aiding them, in teaching The babe to speak, and rousing torpid mind To take the grasp of itself—of this I'll talk; Meaning to mortal man no blame, but only The true recital of mine own deserts. For, soothly, having eyes to see they saw not, And hearing heard not; but like dreamy phantoms, A random life they led from year to year, All blindly floundering on. No craft they knew With woven brick or jointed beam to pile The sunward porch; but in the dark earth burrowed And housed, like tiny ants in sunless caves. No signs they knew to mark the wintry year: The flower-strewn Spring, and the fruit-laden Summer, Uncalendared, unregistered, returned Till I the difficult art of the stars revealed, Their risings and their settings. Numbers, too, I taught them (a most choice device) and how By marshalled signs to fix their shifting thoughts, That Memory, mother of Muses, might achieve

Her wondrous works. I first slaved to the yoke Both ox and ass. I, the rein-loving steeds (Of wealth's gay-flaunting pomp the chiefest pride) Joined to the car; and bade them ease the toils Of labouring men vicarious. I the first Upon the lint-winged car of mariner Was launched, sea-wandering. Such wise arts I found To soothe the ills of man's ephemeral life; But for myself, plunged in this depth of woe, No prop I find.

Hear me yet farther; and in hearing marvel, What arts and curious shifts my wit devised. Chiefest of all, the cure of dire disease Men owe to me. Nor healing food, nor drink, Nor unguent knew they, but did slowly wither And waste away for lack of pharmacy, Till taught by me to mix the soothing drug, And check corruption's march. I fixed the art Of divination with its various phase Of dim revealings, making dreams speak truth, Stray voices, and encounters by the way Significant; the flight of taloned birds On right and left I marked—these fraught with ban, With blissful augury those; their way of life, Their mutual loves and enmities, their flocks, And friendly gatherings; their entrails' smoothness, The hue best liked by the gods, the gall, the liver With all its just proportions. I first wrapped In the smooth fat the thighs; first burnt the loins, And from the flickering flame taught men to spell, No easy lore, and cleared the fire-faced signs Obscure before. Yet more: I probed the Earth, To yield its hidden wealth to help men's weakness-Iron, copper, silver, gold. None but a fool A prating fool will stint me of this praise. And thus with one short word to sum the tale, [I] taught all arts to mortal men".

The lines I have just repeated are not, ladies and gentlemen, as you may suppose, the work of Miss Florence Horsbrugh, or even of the chief permanent official of the Ministry of Education. Nor are they the boastful composition of someone in the advertising department of Imperial Chemical Industries. They are not, at all events, in their original form, of modern composition at all. They were written in the original Greek certainly not later than four-hundred and sixty-five years before Christ by the dramatic poet Aeschylus, and record the personal opinion of his own merits and accomplishments of one Prometheus, a Titan.

Hear, now, what "Scotland's greatest Greek scholar", John Stuart Blackie, whose translation from the *Prometheus* of Aeschylus I have just cited, has to say of this personage:—

"He stood forward as an incarnation of that practical intellect (so triumphant in these latter days), which subjects the rude elements of nature, for human use and convenience, to mechanical calculation and control; but, with all this, he was proud, he was haughty; his Titanic strength and his curious intellect he used, to shake himself free from all

dependence upon the highest power, which the constitution of things had ordered should stand as the strong keystone of the whole. Not to ruin mankind, but to save them, he sinned the sin of Lucifer; he would make himself God; and, as in the eye of a court-martial, the subaltern who usurps the functions of the commander-in-chief stands not acquitted, because he alleges that he acted with a benevolent intent, or for the public good, so, in the faith of an orthodox Athenian, Prometheus was not the less worthy of his airy chains because he defied the will of Jove in the championship of mankind. Neither man nor God may question or impugn the divine decree of supreme Jove, on grounds of expediency or propriety. With the will of Zeus, as with the laws of nature, there is no arguing. In this relationship the first, second, and third point of duty is submission. Such is the doctrine of modern Christian theology; such, also, was the doctrine of the old Hellenic theologer, Hesiod:-

"Vain the wit is of the wisest to deceive the mind of Jove;

"Not Prometheus, son of Iapetus though his heart was moved by love,

"Might escape the heavy anger of the god that rules the skies.

"But, despite of all his cunning, with a strong chain bound he lies". (*Theogony*, 613).

"That practical intellect so triumphant in these latter days", wrote Blackie. Which 'latter days'? Not these latter days. Blackie wrote that over a century ago, certainly before 1846. Since then we have seen over a century of unprecedented acceleration of the process of the incarnation in ever more monstrous forms of 'that practical intellect which subjects the rude elements of nature, for human use and convenience, to mechanical calculation and control'. I need not bring to your minds the apprehensions which animate (or are supposed to animate) the minds of statesmen and subjects alike on that score.

Here in my hand is a work published in England and in English only last year by a writer whom I take to be Polish, though he writes from Amsterdam, R. J. Zwi Werblowsky, Lucifer and Prometheus. It is not a translation. It is a study of Milton's Satan, and is in a style so idiomatic, so gnomonic and so polished as to show no trace of its foreign origin. The writer says that "Largely, and therefore inaccurately speaking, there have been two main schools: the Satanists and the anti-Satanists. The latter can be sub-divided into two not very sharply distinguished groups: those who loathe Satan as the originator or personification of Evil, and those who consider him a mean and contemptible fool. The Satanists too can be divided into perverse extollers of Satan and all he stands for, and into gallant and chivalrous opponents who feel bound in honour to pay homage to the Great Enemy's nobler qualities, his loyalty in leadership, fortitude in adversity, unflinching courage and splendid recklessness, in short, all the qualities usually comprehended by the adjective 'Promethean'."

One can proceed to the heart of this matter only by the use

of stepping-stones. One such is the introduction to the work just cited by Professor Jung. Jung, as you well know, is a famous psychologist and psychiatrist, and I do not wish it to be inferred that we as Social Crediters are to be in any sense overborne by his ways of looking at things. I am suggesting, and I shall, I hope, be able to show, that he has lately been impinging more and more upon our special concerns. We should, I think, most of us, dissent from at least two propositions incidental to Jung's philosophy. One of them is more than incidental, namely the proposition that God is a 'projection' of the human mind or rather is only such a 'projection'. The other proposition is the 'encyclopædic' proposition that systematic analysis is finally sufficient to represent 'Truth'. Jung is not entirely in disagreement with this criticism, since he is the first to confess that in, for example, his analysis of the 'types' of mind, or 'types' of attitude, which human variety exhibits, his view is itself coloured by his own 'type' reactions.

Jung seems a little taken aback to have been asked to introduce a work of literary criticism, and at once remarks that the author whose work has been brought to his notice has "rightly discerned that although the problem of Milton's Paradise Lost is primarily a subject for literary criticism, it is, as a piece of confessional writing, bound up with certain psychological presuppositions". "It is". says Jung, "entirely in accord with psychological expectations that Goethe should dub his Faust a Superman. Nowadays this type extends beyond Nietsche into the field of political psychology, and its incarnation in man has had all the consequences that might have been expected to follow from such a misappropriation of power.

"As human beings do not live in airtight compartments, this infectious inflation has spread everywhere and given rise to extra-ordinary uncertainty in morals and philosophy. The medical psychologist is bound to take an interest in such matters, if only for professional reasons, and so we witness the memorable spectacle of a psychiatrist introducing a critical study of Milton's Paradise Lost. Mediating upon this highly incongrous conjunction, I decided that I should best fulfil my obligations if I explained to the well-intentioned reader how and why the devil got into the consulting-room of the psychiatrist".

I must emphasise that we are not so much concerned with the consulting-room of the psychiatrist as with the world in which the Luciferian qualities of Prometheus, the 'incarnation of that practical intellect', to cite again Professor Blackie, are playing such havoc. Jung is explicit concerning not only 'the misappropriation of power' but concerning other aspects of the problem of power, vis-à-vis what we should term Authority. Nor does this exhaust the points at which he touches what is explicitly a problem of Social Credit. In the first place Social Credit in its most technical aspect is a proffered solution of a problem of Opposites, and its rejection by our generation is, therefore, in some way connected with the psychology of all such rejections. Secondly, what we are contesting above everything else is the Promethean (or the Epimethean) attitude to life itself. I will explain the dubiety, Promethean or Epimethean, later. And, last but not least, there is the peculiar antithesis between the dualist and monist, 'Old Testament', idea on the one hand and the trinitarian conception on the other. But at this point I should remind you of at least the bare features of the Promethean legend. There is a curious variability about it, reflecting, not possibly but probably, a concealed ambiguity of intention of belief or philosophy: something touching Religion, and therefore touching Reality—you will recall what Douglas said of Reigion as a 'binding back' to Reality, in his address on Social Credit as the Policy of a Philosophy.

In one at least of the classical forms of the legend, Prometheus was a Titan who stole fire from Heaven, and, of course, made a gift of it to man, an offence deeply resented by the gods on both counts. It was an unwarrantable misuse of credit and of credit-power. Punishment was decreed: a punishment which would afflict both the corrupter and the corrupted. With commendable resource, it was designed that the punishment should itself be equivocal: it should take the form of a gift. Not a simple, straightforward gift. Pandora (which means 'all-gift' or 'all-giving'), the first created woman, was the gift, she and her box. So Vulcan, the artificer, puddled some clay and fashioned her. Like all Greek stories, the story is rich in suggestion, symbol, imagery, philosophy, under the laughing veil of grace and ease: wisdom.

The Hours decked her with flowers, Suada bestowed upon her her own gift of persuasion, Venus gave her beauty and the art of pleasing, Apollo taught her to sing and Mercury made her eloquent. The Graces made her captivating. Minerva gave openly, but also secretly, from pity adding to the rich but terrible gifts hidden in the box, the gift of Hope. Prometheus means 'forethought', and so, mistrusting, he side-stepped when Pandora presented herself to him; but Epimetheus, whose name means 'afterthought', accepted the messenger and her gift. It is clear that an ideal arrangement would be the combination in a single personality, or integrated individual, of fore-thought and after-thought. Possibly, as Jung suggests, Prometheus and Epimetheus were originally one. The jargon of the psychologists employs the words 'extrovert' and 'introvert' to designate the attitude of a mind dominated, overpowered, by what is without in the one case and by what is within in the other. For one the self is at the mercy of objects; for the other objects scarcely exist. Which, in fact, is the Promethean and which the Epimethean attitude is (such is the uncertainty of psychological outlook) curiously unfixed in the history of the development of these twin characters in literature. One would think that if, of two opposites, the observer could not tell which was which, there was a high probability that they were not two, but one, or similars. But in this case this is not so. The broad distinction between the prolific and the devouring, the fruitful, who brings forth out of himself, and the man who swallows up and takes into himself, into which two classes the English mystic William Blake divided all men, stands. "Religion is an endeavour to reconcile the two". So is Social Credit. Aeschylus, Goethe, Shelley, Spitteler exemplify attempts extending over the long history of literature to throw light upon the problem of the nature and conditions of this reconciliation. The subject matter of Religion and of Politics is the same. Modern psychology is chiefly concerned, in its therapeutic aspects, with the effecting of this reconciliation of opposite tendencies in the sick, in the neurotic and psychotic.

For the moment, what chiefly concerns us, if we are to play our part with due regard to the assistance Douglas has given us, is the more precise definition of what it is we are really trying to do, and more patient examination of the circumstances in which we are trying to do it .Says Jung: "The birth of the deliverer is equivalent to a great catastrophe, since a new and powerful life issues forth just where no life or force or new development was anticipated". Over and over again he emphasises the ascendency of the 'extrovert' attitude in the modern world. He goes further and asserts that increasingly mankind, human individuals, whatever their natural bias, are being forced into an 'extrovert' mould, with most disastrous consequences. The disasters he envisages are those of the break-up of individual human minds; but he is not blind to the fact that the drive towards destruction, the acceleration, is something inherent in the structure of our society as well as something which draws its power, conscripts its reinforcements, from the swollen proportions of psychologically abnormal individuals.

It is my contention that if we are to challenge successfully 'the monstrous overgrowth' of modern industrial expansion, we must know what it is we are challenging. Blackie was both right and wrong when he identified the doctrine of modern Christian theology with submission: submission to what by whom? Submission of Prometheus to Jove? Or with Shelley, of Jove to Prometheus? Of the T.U.C. to I.C.I., or of I.C.I. to the T.U.C? Truly there must be some submission and some subordination. The constitutional suggestion is the submission of Power to Authority. The Christian suggestion is the same. Neither can be effected unless there is comprehension of the tertium non: datur, the trinitarian principle as it is envisaged in the best quarters. I heard only the other day that even Christianity had now been reduced to the old dualism: the Father and the Son were recognised (not wholly in agreement), but the Holy Ghost was rarely alluded to. The very phrase 'Titanic struggle' is diagnostic for us. Annihilation is the only possible end to 'titanic struggles': He who lives by the sword shall fall by the sword. For a long time before his death Douglas was objecting to the representation of the problem of the acceptance of Social Credit as merely an intellectual problem. Social Credit is not itself an 'Opposite', but a reconciliatory symbol, a reconciliatory technique. It would resolve the opposite of what we have with what we have, progressively, so that "a new and powerful life may issue forth just where no life or force or new development was anticipated". Opposites are not to be united rationally. The expression which we in the Social Credit movement seek cannot be contrived; it can be created only through living. That means growing-not merely growing in size (the Promethean inflation), but in life. A curious feature of the 'fantastic overgrowth of modern industry' is the necessity under which it seems to labour to impose upon all who serve it uniformity of attitude. It has use for only one attitude: it is a one-way street. It entices the individual into substitution of his inferior for his superior function, and there is in us all a superior and an inferior capacity to function. Our society is disintegrating. Social Credit is the only thing which could integrate it. If it were so integrated it would assume a new and strange appearance. But at the bottom it is that new and strange appearance which is rationally feared and resisted.

What we are now proposing is that we should not dissipate our energies or confuse our objectives. An intenser realism is needed, based upon a deeper understanding of Social Credit itself and of the social structure to which it applies. Quality of action is of paramount importance. Each man knows his own capacity. The Promethean spirit inspires men to overreach themselves. But everyone has a natural reach of his own. If it is only to give support to the means which we deem most suitable at the moment to feed the public mind, where the public is at its best, we shall be satisfied.

On "Representation"

If Macaulay's New Zealander, after musing on the more material remains of our social system as exemplified in the Houses of Parliament and the Secretariats of Whitehall, should be driven to investigate the concepts of national organisation symbolised by them, it is fairly certain that nothing will astonish him more than the evidence he will find on every hand of the persistent and touching faith of this queer old people in what they call "representation". He will find that this curious superstition (dating back to the earliest days of their history when priests made a corner in deals with God and the dispensing of personal salvation became a close Trust) persisted on even through the First World War, when millions of persons who disliked war and held it in contempt as a moral and material anachronism allowed their representatives not merely to lead them into war which had become inevitable but, almost without a protest, to throw away any poor consolation which might be derived from a real "war to end war". He would note that at irregular and inappropriate intervals queer ceremonies called elections take place at which persons for the most part personally unknown to the electors were "returned" for the ostensible purpose of carrying out "reforms" which most of the electors neither understood nor cared about one fig. And he would further observe that these elected ones, once safely through the ceremony, at once became very superior persons, full of dignity and importance, and for the most part concerned with very intricate relations between the State and Borioboola-Gha. It seemed clear that these same electors never derived any benefit from the negotiations, or in fact and on the whole from more than the very minutest fraction of the activities of their representatives, while further it was quite plain that a small number of very opulent gentry of international sympathies who were not elected and represented no one but themselves, did in fact sway the whole deliberations of the elected assembly. Still this touching faith that some day they would elect the right men and all would be well seemed to sustain the people through a series of disappointments which would have daunted a less stubborn race. The New Zealander, whom we must suppose to be an intelligent man, would, we think, conclude that this was a matter outside logic and reason, and only comparable to collective hypnotism. And he would be right.

—C. H. Douglas in The New Age, April 7, 1921.

"No King But Caesar"

With the sub-heading, "The Church as the Antidote to the Total Political State", the following article appeared in The Tablet for October 30, 1943, and was reproduced in these pages a week later by permission of the Editor of The Tablet, for the information of our readers:—

The main issue of the twentieth century is the political issue. The Jews crying: "We have no King but Caesar" prefigured this age more closely than any period since the heyday of that Roman Empire, in which, whether they accepted or repudiated the Messiah, they did so in terms of secular politics, either thinking that the kingdom of Israel was to be restored again, or protesting their full, fearful acceptance of the Roman new order.

From the beginning the reaction of the Imperial Government to the Church and her Founder was one of suspicion lest this new thing might interfere with the ease and fullness of their political rule. We are still far from realising how universal, and how normal, it has been for ordinary men and women to live without any secure liberty under authorities which, being Church and State in one, covered the whole of life, either by networks of tribal custom or by the decrees and orders of rulers claiming a full divine sanction for their commands. That has been, overwhelmingly through history, the common structure of human society; and it is one to which the world is now rapidly returning, often under the impression that it is advancing towards something new and uplifting and hopeful. The great, unique, exception is the history of Europe since the foundation of the Catholic Church in the heart of the Roman Empire.

It proved an immense exception, because Europe grew immensely strong, spread over America and Australia and made an immense impact upon Asia and Africa, so that the priciples and ideas which we sum up as "European civilisation" are present almost everywhere, and provide a syliabus or outline for social order all over the world. The great mission of the British Empire is to carry and plant and nurse these fruitful principles among peoples with no tradition of their own leading to liberty as the European tradition has led to it. Greece and Rome had their important contributions to make before the coming of the Church but the state of the Roman Empire, the claims and titles and actions of the Emperor, show how ephemeral and transient the influence of the Greek and Roman contribution would have been if left to itself. The liberty which the ancient thinkers sought to define and realise did not go deep, because it was envisaged in a setting of tribal religion; and where men rose toward more universal conceptions, those conceptions were not incarnated in institutions, and were therefore always very much at the mercy of what was concrete and institutional-States and rulers.

The Feast of Christ the King, which Pope Pius XI instituted, was intended to reaffirm a necessary but healthy dualism; to express in the most solemn way that there are boundaries beyond which the lawful authority of civil government must not seek to pass. It is, of course, an easy confusion made by many people to-day to treat some accidental advan-

tage in the temporal order, which comes as a consequence of right belief and the acceptance of revealed truth, as the point and purpose for accepting the Gospel. The condemnation of the Action Française by the same Pope was precisely because Charles Maurras was presenting Catholicism as useful and indeed indispensable for the healthy national life of his people, treating religious truth as deriving its claim to importance from its political by-products. Maurras was fighting against the extreme liberalism and individualism of the last century, and he therefore valued Catholicism for its social conscience, its sense of ordered values, and the high place it gives to government and to national tradition and the sense of a continuing national life. To-day, when men have been made conscious of the opposite dangers, of government being carried into every nook and cranny of human life, there is the complementary danger that they will come to value religion, and in particular the Church, as a protection of their liberty, as though that were the point and ground of her claim of their allegiance.

The Church to-day finds many new, and welcome, friends among people who have come to understand that the authoritative and rigid features in her constitution and history which were most full of scandal for the nineteenth century have, in fact, an integral and vital part in enabling her to withstand through the centuries the immense pressure of political authority, the continuing pull of the totalitarian current. But it is still quite common for men to think that religion is the stronger and better the less it is institutional; even if it is much less common for men to assume that a disembodied religious feeling can in fact maintain itself in a world where other institutions, civil Governments, command not only physical power but psychological power as well.

It is entirely the wrong way to judge institutions simply to look at them in terms of the advantage which the men embodying them in each generation have derived from them. The relevance lies in what the existence of an institution has served to protect; the things it has prevented, and the things it has made possible. It should be taken for granted that the beneficiaries and officials of any institution or vested interest -and every enduring institution is also a vested interestwill tend to take advantage of their position, because it is the nature of man to want comfort and to want power, to be greedy and to be vain. But such abuse, whether venial or graver, is not a reason for abolishing institutions; it is only a reason for reforming them. This is one of the larger lessons of European history from the sixteenth century: that, bad as was the state of the Church, that badness meant that the Church ought to be reformed. It did not mean that the secular power ought to take over those fields of human life and conduct which, because of their direct moral significance, were rightly organised under an independent and universal religious institution and not under territorial secular jurisdictions.

There is no more illuminating approach to the whole past of Europe, including Britain, than to see it, and to teach it in the schools, with the Bishop and not the King as the central figure, the great question in every century being who is to appoint the episcopate, and what the role of the Bishop in society is accepted as being. The Papacy is not only the chief bishopric; it is the bishopric of which the existence and vitality

is essential for the independence and vitality of the episcopate everywhere. Secular rulers have always felt and seldom resisted the temptation to seek a complete control. They have not relished having in their domain persons of an authority and pre-eminence not dependent upon them, and it is the great mark of modern history that they have succeeded in so greatly diminishing, both in fact and in the popular imagination, the scope and reality of any other order than that political order over which they preside.

The English, who have strong visual imagination, think of the Papacy in historical terms where they should think of it in logical terms. They ought to be primarily interested in and attached to the institution as an idea enriching human life, when they would understand it, much more than in historical memories fed to them through all the channels under the control of their temporal Government.

The Church, having a vital interest, for her own life and good estate, in resisting the totalitarian principle, becomes accordingly the champion of other forms of association when they, too, seek to establish their right to exist not by favour of a Government, but by right of what they do, and because they are the particular expressions and achievements whereby men exercise a right which inheres in human nature. What is at stake all the time is a definition of man, a theory about mankind. The high definition sees him as a social being, implicated by the mere fact of his existence in a wide number of relationships, from his direct and overriding relationship with God, extending in the human field through so much more than can be justly called politics. The low definition embraces everything under politics: the life of society, organised in and through the State, whether directly or through associations created by the State to play this or that minor part. It is extraordinary how many people lose sight of the degradation or lowering of man which comes from enthroning this conception, because they are dazzled by the idea of the benefits which political centralisation can organise. The truth is that much more is gained than is lost by recognising many centres of life and authority as corresponding to the fullness of human nature; and that the inevitable boundary disputes which will go on all the time between those different centres are a price to be paid, because only in multiplicity can there be freedom. This freedom is not itself the final end, or the cause or ground for recognising spiritual authority. That authority itself, just as it has its claims on the State, has its claims over men. It does not offer its teachings as a matter of predilection or fancy but as a revelation of the duty of man. It proposes an interior discipline, of will, mind and body, which is proposed for voluntary acceptance, but is of its nature a discipline. Its great sanction is not here and now; but it can illustrate its claim that men are not as well placed as they fancy by the spectacle of the much harsher slaveries into which men at once fall who refuse it. There could be no greater commentary on the presumptuous infidelity which the eighteenth century made its title-deeds to a splendid future for mankind than the increasingly cruel servitudes which the sovereignty of secularised politics has extended over so many millions, in the course of our swift process of return towards the bondage of antiquity.